

# The Quantum Threat

and its impact on Hardware Security Modules

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# HSMs protecting traditional and emerging use cases

## Emerging



Protect blockchains  
and **crypto assets / cbdc**



Secure **5G** privacy and  
authentication



Create secure  
digital identities for  
**IoT** and **secure  
manufacturing**

## Traditional



Code and document  
**digital signatures**



Secure **PKI**  
root keys



Protect **Database**  
encryption keys and  
**application** keys



**Key Management Systems**  
root of trust in the cloud  
and on premise

# How an HSM can help - What is an HSM and Why is it Important?

- Keys secured in physical **tamper resistant** hardware
- Private **keys cannot be extracted**
- Certified Cryptography Mechanisms** performed in a secure environment
- Keys generated with high quality **hardware entropy**
- Crypto agility**, continuous updates to mitigate new risks (Quantum Threat)
- Independent certification** such as FIPS 140-2 / FIPS 140-3 and Common Criteria EAL4+



# The quantum computing race is on



# A new threat in the IT galaxy

Quantum computing puts cryptographic algorithms at risk.

➤ especially public-key cryptography




# How a quantum computer impacts cryptography

CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHM TARGETED	TYPE	PURPOSE	IMPACT FROM LARGE SCALE QC
RSA	Public key	Signatures, Key establishment	<b>No longer secure</b>
Digital Signature Algorithm		Signatures, Key exchange	
ECDSA (Elliptic Curve DSA)			

CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHM TARGETED	TYPE	PURPOSE	IMPACT FROM LARGE SCALE QC
AES	Symmetric key	Encryption	<b>Longer keys needed</b>
SHA-2, SHA-3	-----	Hash functions	<b>Larger output needed</b>



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An iceberg floating in the ocean. The tip of the iceberg is visible above the water surface, while the much larger, jagged base is submerged below. The background is a blue sky with light clouds and a calm sea.

# Beyond algorithms, **threat impacts**

OVERALL ECOSYSTEM

- ▶ **Communication protocols**  
(TLS, IPsec, SSH, ...)
- ▶ **Certificates** (X.509)  
(Identities, Code Signing, Doc Signing)
- ▶ **Key management protocols**


# 15 to 20 years away to break current asymmetric cryptography?

LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATED BY THE EXPERT (may be interpreted as risk)



## 2023 EXPERTS' ESTIMATES OF LIKELIHOOD OF A QUANTUM COMPUTER ABLE TO BREAK RSA-2048 IN 24 HOURS

The experts indicated their estimate for the likelihood of a quantum computer that is cryptographically relevant—in the specific sense of being able to break RSA-2048 quickly—for various time frames, from a short term of 5 years all the way to 30 years.



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### Authors

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GLOBAL  
RISK  
INSTITUTE



DECEMBER 2023


**D date** still **UNCERTAIN**

**THALES**



# Mosca's Theorem – store now, decrypt later – data at risk

“According to Michele Mosca's Theorem  $(X+Y)>Z$ , if the amount of time that data must remain secure (X) plus the time it takes to upgrade cryptographic systems (Y) is greater than when quantum computers come online with enough power to break cryptography (Z), you have already run out of time”



“The experts' likelihood estimates for when a cryptographically relevant quantum computer will appear suggest that some companies might already be facing an intolerable risk requiring urgent action.” Dr. M. Mosca.

# Confidential Communications at risk



VPN Session



Handshake Data Exchange



Quantum attack using  
Shor's algorithm

Key Establishment

Obtain private key


Ciphertext

Decrypt using  
extracted key

Plaintext


# Mosca's Theorem – connected/critical devices at risk

“According to Michele Mosca's Theorem  $(X+Y)>Z$ , if the amount of time the device must remain secure (X) plus the time it takes to upgrade the device with PQC (Y) is greater than when quantum computers come online with enough power to break cryptography (Z), you have already run out of time”




## What's at risk?

Durable connected devices (IoT) with **long in-field lives**



### Networking Devices



EDUCBA

Code Signing



PKI




TLS

## What's the attack?

**Forged software updates** by quantum-enabled adversaries




# Digital Identities at risk



There are more than  
**4.5 million active users**  
in the U.S. DoD identity  
management system.

Creating a quantum-safe duplicate  
infrastructure is time-consuming  
and cost prohibitive.



### **NSA:**

- SW/Firmware-signing: begin transition immediately
- Web browsers/servers/cloud services: support and prefer CNSA 2.0 by 2025
- Traditional networking equipment (virtual private networks, routers): support and prefer CNSA 2.0 by 2026


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**ANSSI:** recommends introducing post-quantum defense-in-depth as soon as possible for security products aimed at offering a long-lasting protection of information

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**BSI:** it's no longer a question of 'if' or 'when' there will be quantum computers, PQC will become the standard in the long term

# Future-proof with crypto agility



## Quantum is coming

Quantum capabilities are accelerating

NIST and others are finalizing quantum safe standards

PKI based crypto will become hybrid



## Know your risks

Long term data is at risk, if using classic technologies

Consider that it is vulnerable to harvest now, decrypt later

Connected devices deployed on the field for a long period of time are at risks



## Focus on crypto agility

Crypto Agility is the best practice; requires supporting infrastructure

Take a hybrid approach by using classic & quantum-safe crypto solutions



## Stronger Together


Assess your crypto agility maturity and readiness

Design a quantum safe architecture

Be ready for change, even after standards are established

Evaluate solutions and partnerships in place today to support your quantum safe initiatives

# Building a future-proof Quantum strategy



## Standards

**NIST**

**I E T F**

**PKI Consortium**

**ANSI**

**ETSI** World Class Standards

**NCCOE** NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY CENTER OF EXCELLENCE


**Accredited Standards Committee X9** Financial Industry Standards

**CAB** CA/BROWSER FORUM

**CSA** cloud security alliance®



# The NIST Standardization Process and PQC implementations



NIST finalist FALCON was sponsored and co-developed by Thales along with academic and industrial partners from France (University of Rennes 1, PQShield SAS), Switzerland (IBM), Canada (NCC Group), and the US (Brown U, Qualcomm).

# Foundations of a Quantum-Safe solution



## Key Management

Up to date key inventory,  
protect key exchanges ASAP  
with PQC KEM



## PQC Algorithms

NIST Post Quantum Algorithms  
HSS, ML-DSA, ML-KEM, SHL-DSA,  
Classic McEliece, ...



## Key Generation

Enhance TRNG with QRNG  
(Provably Unpredictable Keys  
From Quantum Computers)

THALES

**Thank you**

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